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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
DEGREE OF CARE OWED BY SHOPKEEPER
TO BUSINESS INVITEE
Biggs v. Hutzler Brothers Co.'
Plaintiff, a customer, was walking east in a twelve-foot
aisle of defendant's department store. A female employee
of the store, walking south along a cross aisle, collided with
plaintiff and caused her to fall, breaking her wrist. Mer-
chandise displayed in the aisles appears to have obstructed
the view of both parties so that neither saw the other ad-
vancing; but plaintiff testified that she was aware, out of
the corner of her left eye, of an approaching figure just
before the impact. Suit for damages was decided in favor
of defendant, and affirmed.
The questions of law presented are as to what rule of
negligence governs under the circumstances and what pre-
cedents may properly be applied to the facts. A business
invitee, using reasonable care on his own part for his own
safety, is entitled to expect that the occupier of the prem-
ises will exercise, on his part, reasonable care to prevent
damage from unusual danger of which he knows or ought
to know;2 and where there is evidence of neglect, the ques-
tions as to whether or not reasonable care has been taken,
and whether there was contributory negligence must be
determined by the jury.8 Counsel for the plaintiff cited
Moore v. American Stores Co.4 to show that a higher
degree of care and diligence is required by one who in-
vites the public to his premises; but, in that case, the facts
were that a greasy substance was left on the floor, which
substance caused the customer to slip and fall. The Court
held that the rule was inapplicable to the case at hand be-
cause this accident was not due to any foreign substance
on the floor nor to boxes or obstructions placed in the aisle,
as in Chalmers v. Tea Co., but resulted from normal use of
the two aisles intersecting at right angles, one being used by
the patron of the store and the other by an employee. The
question is, then, whether either party was negligent; and
if so, which one, or both. That issue was fairly submitted
1 181 Md. 50, 28 A. (2d) 609 (1942). For the trial court opinion denying
the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, see Baltimore Daily Record, Feb-
ruary 10, 1942.
2 Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 2 0. P. 311 (1867). See also PRossEB,
ToRTs (1941) 642.
" Ibid.
'169 Md. 541, 182 A. 436 (1936).
172 Md. 552, 192 A. 419 (1937).
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to the jury on the facts as a question for them to determine.
The verdict does not disclose whether there was found no
negligence on either side or whether both were negligent
in not seeing each other, for in either case the verdict
should be for defendant.
The most generally accepted theory for the basis of the
special obligation placed on an occupier of land who in-
vites the public to his premises is based on the economic
benefit to him from the presence of the visitor. On this
basis, there must be at least a potential profit to the shop-
keeper in the business of the invitee. A second theory is
that the occupier impliedly represents that reasonable care
has been exercised to make the premises safe for those who
come on the property for the purpose intended by the
occupier. Historically, the former theory carries the
greater weight, but more recent trends indicate that the
second is gaining favor.
As pointed out by the Court, this case is the first of its
kind known in this jurisdiction; and there are only two
other known cases dealing with like or similar circum-
stances in the country, one in Connecticut, the other in
California.6 In the Connecticut case, plaintiff contended
that he, as an invited guest, was entitled to a higher degree
of care on the part of defendant than would be required
in the pursuance of ordinary business operations; but the
Court, referring to its refusal to apply the doctrine of a
higher and different standard of care than in ordinary
business to the conduct of places of public amusement,
said:
"Due care in such a case is care proportional to the
nature of instrumentalities involved and the circum-
stances ordinarily attendant. Due care may in, any
given case mean great care; the care is always to be
proportionate to attendant requirements and hazard".
In Schell v. United Rys. & Electric Co.,7 the Maryland
Court said, similarly:
"Negligence is essentially relative and comparative
and dependent on circumstances, and its existence is
therefore to be determined from the facts and sur-
roundings of each case".
Geoghegan v. G. Fox & Co., Inc., 104 Conn. 129, 132 A. 408 (1926) ; and
Brisbin v. Wise Co., 6 Cal. Ap. (2d) 441, 44 P. (2d) 622 (1935).
r 144 Md. 527, 125 A. 158 (1924).
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This "due care" is what is required of a department
store. It must not by its own "active negligence" injure
the invitee.
In the California case,8 it was held that the plaintiff was
under a duty to keep a lookout for clerks and other persons
using the aisleways; and it was just as much her duty to
exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person for her
own safety as it was the duty of defendant to exercise such
case, each owing the same degree of care to avoid injury to
the other.
Objectively, this case serves to determine whether the
rule of "greater degree of care", as applied by the courts
with respect to a shopkeeper's premises, would be applied
also to his duty respecting the conduct of his employees.
The duty as to premises has been summarized:
"Thus, while a merchant who invites the public on
his premises to inspect and purchase goods is held to a
higher or greater degree of care and diligence than
otherwise, yet he is not an insurer of the safety of his
patrons, and is therefore not liable for injuries caused
by some defect in the premises, in the absence of any
evidence tending to show that he or his agents knew or
should have known, by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, of this defect".9
In Moore v. American Stores Co.,"0 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland criticizes this statement as not entirely accu-
rate, saying:
"The inviter, under such circumstances, is under
no duty to exercise any higher or greater degree of
care than any other inviter would be; but, to discharge
the duty imposed on him of exercising ordinary care
for the safety of business visitors to his premises, he
may be required to take different measures or precau-
tions than would one who invited others to his private
residence for purposes of social intercourse or even
business."
It is evident that plaintiff sought this additional protec-
tion to his interests. But, of course, the rule of shop-
keeper's liability includes only injuries arising "on ac-
8 Supra, n. 6.
9 Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 176, 186.10 169 Md. 541, 546, 182 A. 436 (1936).
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count of conditions of the premises",1 and Moore v. Amer-
ican Stores Co. also dealt with such a situation. However,
in the case of Brisbin v. Wise Co., 2 the question of the duty
of the shopkeeper to keep premises and passageways in
safe condition, and use ordinary care to avoid injuring his
patrons and invitees is entirely beside the issues in the
case, and the Supreme Court held that the trial court prop-
erly declined to instruct on that subject.
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the
essential question-whether the plaintiff's interests are
entitled to legal protection against defendant's conduct.1 3
The conduct complained of is the act of walking without
observing the progress of others who may be moving so as
to intersect the path, with attendant risk of collision.
Unless the progress of the injuring party be so swift
or unpredictable as to prevent the one injured from avoid-
ing contact, there seems to be no reason why the accident
should occur; for if the path be straight and the speed
moderate, an ordinarily prudent person could contrive to
be out of danger's way, or if the traveler should come upon
a "blind" intersection, knowing it to be there or having
reason to believe that it might be there, he should prepare
himself for the contingency of meeting someone at the
crossing of the ways. It therefore follows, that unless
some recklessness in defendant be shown, plaintiff will be
faced with the difficult problem of explaining why he did
not avoid the collision; for it is not a foregone conclusion
that the party injured may obtain for his interests protec-
tion at the hands of the courts when he has failed to use
care and diligence to protect them for himself.
Certainly the plaintiff received full protection when in
the instant case the jury was allowed to pass on such mat-
ters when nothing more than the fact of injury was shown
to indicate the defendant's negligence.
"I Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 176, 181 (italics supplied).
22 Supra, n. 6.II PaossER, TORTS (1941) 180.
